Barack Obama, Nuclear Weapons, and the Wrong Kind of Experience

As I've said previously, this isn't a blog about the the U.S. Presidential Campaign. I don't want to step too far into the whole morass that is campaign blogging, and I don't intend on spilling ink analyzing contenders' laughs, comparing fund-raising numbers, or, for that matter, making specific endorsements. That said, every once in a while something resembling intelligent discourse on global affairs manages to filter its way through the campaign noise, and in such cases I'll briefly comment.

In this case, I'd like to call attention to a speech made Tuesday by Barack Obama, the inexperience of whom is frequently derided in the campaign's prevailing press narrative. Obama called for the United States to work earnestly toward the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Some might brush this off as overly-idealistic fluff, unworthy of a serious presidential contender, but I think it is time to put nuclear non-proliferation, coupled with nuclear disarmament, back on the agenda for serious political thinkers.

I'd like to call readers' attention to a recent article in Foreign Affairs by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky. This man knows something about nuclear weapons; he is a particle physicist who worked on the original Manhattan project, was an adviser to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Carter, and had a front-row seat to the evolution of nuclear technology over the last century. Panofsky, echoing such left-wing peaceniks as George Shultz, William Perry and Henry Kissinger, convincingly argues that, whatever their past merits, nuclear weapons have no place as a serious component of a modern U.S. global posture, and that what limited role they have as a strategic backstop could be played with a dramatically reduced arsenal. Furthermore, he argues that the political and strategic costs of an over-inflated nuclear posture far outweigh the benefits, and that the current American nuclear arsenal actually makes us less secure.

Before I continue, I would like to emphasize that we have, in some ways, made progress in nuclear disarmament. During the mid-1980s, for example, the combined U.S.-Soviet nuclear arsenal topped 70,000 warheads. In retrospect, the insanity of such a buildup is difficult to comprehend. A recent hypothetical study on the effects of a small regional nuclear war (such as an Indo-Pakistani exchange) predicts tens of millions of immediate casualties, and catastrophic damage to the global climate that would shake the foundations of modern civilization.

That's with the detonation of approximately 100 small weapons.

The notion that some of the most intelligent people in both the United States and the USSR found it necessary to build nuclear arsenals that could independently render the Earth uninhabitable several times over simply defies my understanding (before people chime in with explanations, I understand the internally consistent logic of attempting to mitigate the possibility of a nuclear first-strike, but the logic of psychosis is often internally consistent). Since the Cold War, both superpowers have considerably cut back their arsenals, but the United States remains in possession of over 10,000 warheads including reserve stocks (they are scheduled to be reduced by 2012, but still remain in the thousands). This is well above the level necessary to deter a foreign nuclear attack, and the maintenance of so many weapons does nothing to enhance American security.

Even more counterproductive, though, has been the Administration's pursuit of a new generation of nuclear warheads, in the form of the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program. If the purpose of nuclear weapons is to provide a strategic backstop - a red line drawn around vital security interests that hostile powers may not cross - marginal improvements in quality and reliability will have negligible effect (the notion that, were the United States to launch 400 warheads, two or three might conceivably fail is not likely to significantly alter a potential adversary's cost-benefit calculus). Still more dangerous are plans advanced by some in the government to design a new generation of miniature "bunker buster" nuclear weapons with the intention of using them in situations other than all-out nuclear war.

Whatever tactical advantage might be gained from such developments would be more than outweighed by the damage done to American credibility as a champion of non-proliferation, as well as by the unnecessary re-escalation of an increasingly crowded nuclear arms race. By continuing to give robust nuclear forces a central role in U.S. global policy, we not only expose our non-proliferation efforts to well-grounded charges of hypocrisy (there is that little clause in the NPT that requires nuclear states to work towards eliminating their arsenals), hindering our ability to rally global opinion against potential proliferators like Iran, we also reinforce the norm that only states with nuclear weapons are worthy of international standing. The Iranian nuclear program, for example, certainly has some basis in defensive realism; but, harping on about Iranian nuclear "rights" plays well with the population and shores up the regime in Tehran precisely because the Iranian people view nuclear capabilities as markers of international prestige. Efforts to convince them otherwise ring somewhat hollow when lead by states with thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert.

When we consider the current U.S. nuclear posture, then, we ought to remember that maintaining a large nuclear arsenal comes with serious political and strategic costs, while delivering limited benefits. Coming back to the campaign, Obama recently stated at a debate that he would not use nuclear weapons in the fight against terrorism. His rivals (Sen. Clinton in particular) chided him for his supposed naivete and inexperience, but upon reflection, many commentators wondered what possible use nuclear weapons would be against groups of guerillas holed up in the mountains of Pakistan. The exchanges reminded me of a quote by a certain Lord Salisbury while stationed in British India:

If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.

Whatever happens with the campaign, Senator Obama may be commended for injecting a drop of that.

Barack Obama

Let me be clear, I don't mean to spend very much time on this blog writing about the U.S. Presidential election. For one thing, it is still more than a year away, for another, this blog is meant to be about global politics writ large, not the slings and arrows of American electoral wrangling. Still, the President of the United States remains by almost any reasonable estimate the most powerful individual on Earth, thus it seems reasonable to devote a bit of space musing about how the various candidates would handle themselves in office. Barack Obama, evidently making an effort to dispel the notion that he is all fluff and no substance, recently gave a foreign policy address at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. I must say I'm fairly impressed, though the speech does not appreciably add to his thoughts on international affairs outlined in the Senator's most recent book The Audacity of Hope. Obama seems to be, at least in rhetoric, a sensible leader in the making. Seth Weinberger gives the Senator's speech mixed reviews, in particular on Iraq and military reform, but I take serious issue with some of his criticisms:

First, there is increasing evidence that the surge is paying dividends. It's too early to claim that it's working, but it does seem to be creating the possibility of success in the future. It's clear that Congress is not going to stand up to the president's veto and try to enforce a hard withdrawal deadline. What's not so obvious is how the tune changes when a presidential candidate becomes president... Candidate Obama may want to bring the boys home, but President Obama will see that decision in a different light.

Paying dividends? Hardly. It is instructive that the first article Dr. Weinberger cites to support his case, from the Washington Post, paints a picture far more grim than positive. The one American strategy the article cites as creating some progress - that of walling off neighborhoods - has recently been roundly rejected by the local population and Iraqi government (such as it is). The grizzly details, the killings, the suicide bombings, have not appreciably slowed down, certainly not when Iraq is taken in aggregate rather than reduced to events in Baghdad. A somewhat more sobering assessment was offered recently in a Washington Post op-ed by Senator Joe Biden of Delaware. A few highlights:

The problem is that for every welcome development, there is an equally or even more unwelcome development that gives lie to the claim that we are making progress. For example:

• While violence against Iraqis is down in some Baghdad neighborhoods where we have "surged" forces, it is up dramatically in the belt ringing Baghdad. The civilian death toll increased 15 percent from February to March. Essentially, when we squeeze the water balloon in one place, it bulges somewhere else.
• It is true that Sadr has not been seen, but he has been heard, rallying his followers with anti-American messages and encouraging his thugs to take on American troops in the south. Intelligence experts believe his militia is simply waiting out the surge.
• Closing markets to vehicles has precluded some car bombs, but it also has prompted terrorists to change tactics and walk in with suicide vests. The road from the airport to Baghdad may be safer, but the skies above it are more lethal -- witness the ironic imposition of "no-fly zones" for our own helicopters.

The second article Weinberger cites is taken from The Weekly Standard. Enough said. The fact is, there is simply no way our military or citizenry can or will countenance a large troop presence in Iraq for years to come. The United States will be out of Iraq shortly into the next presidency, the only question is how we will leave.

I certainly don't think Obama's approach to Iraq is perfect. For one thing, while he acknowledges that a political solution is necessary in order to leave Iraq in a state of something other than genocidal anarchy, he offers no such solution. I happen to believe that a loose federal arrangement, what David Brooks has called a "soft-partition," presents the best chance for success, but irrespective of whether or not the Illinois Senator agrees, he needs to present something.

As for Obama's proposal to increase the size of our military, it is not a bad idea per se, though once again I must vehemently disagree with Dr. Weinberger's comments:

...the military doesn't just need to grow, it needs to do so smartly. The US military is clearly sufficiently large and well-equipped and trained to deal with a traditional military threat. Now, the US military needs to develop a nation-building capability. The needs of nation-building are not the same as combat, and the US needs to be capable of both.

The only reason the United States would need to transform its military into a "nation-building" institution (by which I assume Dr. Weinberger means a military capable of fighting large-scale counter-insurgencies, propping up governments, building national infrastructure at high speed, winning the trust of the local population in the context of a long occupation etc.) would be if we were planning on repeating the Iraq experience. While I strongly agree with Senator Obama that Americans must not turn inward in disgust from the Iraq experience - the world needs responsible U.S. leadership more than ever - we ought not focus on increasing our capacity to act as a nineteenth century colonial power. Our military must be able to respond to large scale conventional threats, and it must have the kind of flexibility to conduct low-level special forces operations and play advisory roles against shadowy terrorist networks (as it is currently doing with little fanfare in the Philippines), but the army's post-Vietnam decision to turn away from counter-insurgency and large-scale occupations was the right one, and it ought to be reinforced by the Mesopotamian debacle.

Overall, Obama (along with several other Democratic candidates) seems ready to revive the kind of muscular, pragmatic liberalism that the United States sorely needs to embrace in the coming years. I am impressed, though not awed, by Obama's vision. I hope elements of it make it into the White House, whoever its next occupant may be.

Mais Apres Nous, la Deluge...

I find the results of the first round Presidential elections in France both heartening and dismaying; heartening because it is nice to see that my own country is not alone in having a political class beset by paralysis and bereft of the capacity to solve pressing problems, dismaying because France will be ill-served by either candidate.

Forgetting for a moment the contortions Mme. Royal and M. Sarkozy are performing in order to attract the critical 18% of centrist voters who put their support behind Bayrou in this most recent round, let’s examine the two candidates’ visions for the future of France. The French, it seems to an outsider, have three central political issues to resolve as the 21st Century moves out of the starting gate. The first is European integration, that is, how much further to enmesh France politically and economically within the E.U., and how to relate to that body now that its growth in membership precludes France being its undisputed boss. The second is the effective integration of non-European immigrants, Muslims in particular, into France’s economy and society in a way that is fair and just but that does not produce a socially corrosive xenophobic backlash. The third is the economy writ large, namely, how to build a dynamic French economy capable of effectively competing in the global market without dismantling the mechanisms of economic justice that the French hold so dear.

These issues are, of course, all linked. To cite some obvious examples, one main question with respect to the European Union concerns France’s support of Turkey’s admission to the body, an event that would surely have a huge impact on Muslim immigration. Economically, France’s soaring unemployment rate, hovering somewhere around 9%, is disproportionately concentrated among immigrant youth, exacerbating cultural tensions with parallel divisions of class. Any solution to these myriad problems must be holistic, integrated and dramatic. Neither Mme. Royal nor M. Sarkozy present such a program.

Ségolène Royal, the socialist who has made much of breaking with the aging “elephants” of her party seems to lack the direction and resolve to institute the difficult reforms that her people sorely need. She has some good ideas, true, particularly with respect to reforming the education system to make sure France has the human capital necessary to compete in a global economy (would the leadership of a certain other country could make some similar propositions); however, she does not propose any serious measures to shake the stagnant French welfare state out of its lethargy, encourage dynamic entrepreneurship (so very Anglo-Saxon I know) or increase per-capita productivity.

This may sound hypocritical coming from the last American on Earth to hold a 35 hour per week job (the nonprofit sector is a wonderful thing), but a modern industrialized economy simply cannot remain competitive with a citizenry that lives as relaxed a lifestyle as that of modern France. The advantages in education, technology, infrastructure and military prowess that have kept Western nations wealthy for the last two centuries are rapidly fading, and nations like France will have to figure out how to compete with rising behemoths like China and India on a more level playing field. This will not happen if 25% of the workforce continues to be employed in stable, safe, low-stress, wholly unproductive government jobs. If France wants to arrest its slow-but-steady decline from wealth and economic prominence, its people will have to accept a job market that is a bit more fluid, a social safety net that is a bit less robust, and a schedule that allows for a bit less time camping by the Loire. Mme. Royal has spent her campaign in the unfortunate pursuit of promising everything to everyone, and I fear that many will have to be disappointed should she take office.

M. Sarkozy, on the other hand, combines marginally more sensible economic principles with barely-masked xenophobia, a bullish attitude towards the poor and immigrants, and a vision for the future of Europe that would make Samuel Huntington proud. His economic policy, calling for a reformed tax structure and a reexamination of the 35 hour work week among other things, may indeed rouse the French economy from its zombie-like state. Unfortunately, his overly-nationalist vision of France will only serve to alienate other members of the increasingly moribund E.U. His opposition to the entry of Turkey, the one secular Muslim democracy on the face of the Earth, would do almost as much as the U.S. invasion of Iraq to cement the notion of a civilizational clash between the West and the Islamic world, and given France’s large number of Muslim immigrants, that clash is as likely to play itself out in the banlieux of Paris as it is on the streets of Beirut. Also, much as it pains me to say it, while Bush is in office I’d caution against a French leader getting overly chummy with the United States.

As I say, heartened and dismayed. Looking at this election from abroad, I cannot help but get the sense that neither candidate has a real, integrated, dynamic vision for twenty-first century France. I am reminded of the late Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s comments about American politics in 1985: “our masters are intellectually baffled and analytically impotent before the long-term crises of our age – … they know neither causes nor cures and are desperately improvising on the edge of catastrophe.” In many ways, it’s a small world.